PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.4` contain incomplete request-throttling protections for auth-checkable endpoints. In `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.3`, a fully implemented `RateLimitMiddleware` existed in `internal/handlers/middleware.go` but was not inserted into the production HTTP handler chain, so requests were not subject to the intended per-IP throttle. In the same pre-`v0.8.4` range, the original limiter also keyed clients using `X-Forwarded-For`, which would have allowed client-controlled header spoofing if the middleware had been enabled. `v0.8.4` addressed those two issues by wiring the limiter into the live handler chain and switching the key to the immediate peer IP, but it still exempted `/health` and `/metrics` from rate limiting even though `/health` remained an auth-checkable endpoint when a token was configured. This issue weakens defense in depth for deployments where an attacker can reach the API, especially if a weak human-chosen token is used. It is not a direct authentication bypass or token disclosure issue by itself. PinchTab is documented as local-first by default and uses `127.0.0.1` plus a generated random token in the recommended setup. PinchTab's default deployment model is a local-first, user-controlled environment between the user and their agents; wider exposure is an intentional operator choice. This lowers practical risk in the default configuration, even though it does not by itself change the intrinsic base characteristics of the bug. This was fully addressed in `v0.8.5` by applying `RateLimitMiddleware` in the production handler chain, deriving the client address from the immediate peer IP instead of trusting forwarded headers by default, and removing the `/health` and `/metrics` exemption so auth-checkable endpoints are throttled as well.

There are packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability referenced in the following CVE:

  - PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab
    `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.4` contain incomplete request-throttling protections for auth-checkable endpoints.
    In `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.3`, a fully implemented `RateLimitMiddleware` existed in
    `internal/handlers/middleware.go` but was not inserted into the production HTTP handler chain, so requests
    were not subject to the intended per-IP throttle. In the same pre-`v0.8.4` range, the original limiter
    also keyed clients using `X-Forwarded-For`, which would have allowed client-controlled header spoofing if
    the middleware had been enabled. `v0.8.4` addressed those two issues by wiring the limiter into the live
    handler chain and switching the key to the immediate peer IP, but it still exempted `/health` and
    `/metrics` from rate limiting even though `/health` remained an auth-checkable endpoint when a token was
    configured. This issue weakens defense in depth for deployments where an attacker can reach the API,
    especially if a weak human-chosen token is used. It is not a direct authentication bypass or token
    disclosure issue by itself. PinchTab is documented as local-first by default and uses `127.0.0.1` plus a
    generated random token in the recommended setup. PinchTab's default deployment model is a local-first,
    user-controlled environment between the user and their agents; wider exposure is an intentional operator
    choice. This lowers practical risk in the default configuration, even though it does not by itself change
    the intrinsic base characteristics of the bug. This was fully addressed in `v0.8.5` by applying
    `RateLimitMiddleware` in the production handler chain, deriving the client address from the immediate peer
    IP instead of trusting forwarded headers by default, and removing the `/health` and `/metrics` exemption
    so auth-checkable endpoints are throttled as well. (CVE-2026-33621)

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
439173	SCA: security update for github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab (GHSA-j65m-hv65-r264)	Tenable Cloud Security	SCA Checks	medium
439173	SCA: security update for github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab (GHSA-j65m-hv65-r264)	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	SCA Checks	medium

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2026-33621

medium

Tenable Plugins

medium

medium