In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack variable: u32 data = 0; memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length); req->length is derived from the host-controlled USB request path, which can lead to a stack out-of-bounds write. Validate req->actual against the expected payload size for the supported control selectors and decode only the expected amount of data. This avoids copying a host-influenced length into a fixed-size stack object.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6da4fed7537aec19880c24f6c3a95065adb1406
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be2d32f0c3fe333d14c0a9ca90328dacbc3e06b8
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e5eb1d6e6a3d7bbea9c92132d0cda5793176426
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e0e34d85cd46ceb37d16054e97a373a32770f6c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/557d1d4e862eccd0b74cc377b66de3e1e8d49605
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26304d124e7f0383f8fe1168b5801a0ac7e16b1c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21b11e8581285c6f10ef43d05df349d445f24273
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d41772d98dcaf6c17e875b7d0ea0154ae1191ee