In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate EaNameLength in smb2_get_ea() smb2_get_ea() reads ea_req->EaNameLength from the client request and passes it directly to strncmp() as the comparison length without verifying that the length of the name really is the size of the input buffer received. Fix this up by properly checking the size of the name based on the value received and the overall size of the request, to prevent a later strncmp() call to use the length as a "trusted" size of the buffer. Without this check, uninitialized heap values might be slowly leaked to the client.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfc6878d14acafffbe670bf2576620757a10a3d8
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/551dfb15b182abad4600eaf7b37e6eb7000d5b1b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3363a770b193f555f29d76ddf4ced3305c0ccf6d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/243b206bcb5a7137e8bddd57b2eec81e1ebd3859