In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix potencial OOB in get_file_all_info() for compound requests When a compound request consists of QUERY_DIRECTORY + QUERY_INFO (FILE_ALL_INFORMATION) and the first command consumes nearly the entire max_trans_size, get_file_all_info() would blindly call smbConvertToUTF16() with PATH_MAX, causing out-of-bounds write beyond the response buffer. In get_file_all_info(), there was a missing validation check for the client-provided OutputBufferLength before copying the filename into FileName field of the smb2_file_all_info structure. If the filename length exceeds the available buffer space, it could lead to potential buffer overflows or memory corruption during smbConvertToUTF16 conversion. This calculating the actual free buffer size using smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len() and returning -EINVAL if the buffer is insufficient and updating smbConvertToUTF16 to use the actual filename length (clamped by PATH_MAX) to ensure a safe copy operation.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/beef2634f81f1c086208191f7228bce1d366493d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0cd9725fe2bcc9f37d096b132318a9060373f5d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d7032851d6f5adbe2739601ca456c0ad3b422f0
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7aec5a769d2356cbf344d85bcfd36de592ac96a5
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cca3eff2099b18672934a39cee70aed835d652c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a852f9d1c981fb14f6bf4e24999e0ea8088a7d7
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/358cdaa1f7fbf2712cb4c5f6b59cb9a5c673c5fe