OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback); and have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled). If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly. Starting in version 2026.2.14, the upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw's temp uploads root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected.

OpenClaw Multiple Vulnerabilities February 20

The version of the OpenClaw AI assistant installed on the remote host is prior to 2026.2.14. It is, therefore, affected by multiple vulnerabilities, including:

  - A command injection in the maintainer clawtributors updater script allowed arbitrary command execution via crafted     git commit author metadata. (CVE-2026-26323)

  - The Gateway tool accepted a tool-supplied gatewayUrl without sufficient restrictions, enabling SSRF via outbound     WebSocket connections to user-specified targets. (CVE-2026-26322)

  - The optional Telnyx webhook handler could accept unsigned inbound webhook requests when telnyx.publicKey is not     configured, allowing unauthenticated callers to forge Telnyx events. (CVE-2026-26319)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

There are packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability referenced in the following CVE:

  - OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read
    arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the
    browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs
    without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise
    invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as
    required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the
    onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback); and have the `browser` tool permitted by
    tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled). If an operator exposes the
    Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases
    accordingly. Starting in version 2026.2.14, the upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw's temp uploads
    root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected. (CVE-2026-26329)

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
299797	OpenClaw < 2026.2.14 Multiple Vulnerabilities	Nessus	Artificial Intelligence	high
437784	SCA: security update for openclaw (GHSA-cv7m-c9jx-vg7q)	Tenable Cloud Security	SCA Checks	high
437784	SCA: security update for openclaw (GHSA-cv7m-c9jx-vg7q)	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	SCA Checks	high

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2026-26329

high

Tenable Plugins

Coming Soon

high

high

high