Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name} is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's name for the final email. This mechanism contained two security-relevant bugs: * It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}. This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive information from the system configuration, including even database passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were not fully effective for the email subject. * Placeholders in subjects and plain text bodies of emails were wrongfully evaluated twice. Therefore, if the first evaluation of a placeholder again contains a placeholder, this second placeholder was rendered. This allows the rendering of placeholders controlled by the ticket buyer, and therefore the exploitation of the first issue as a ticket buyer. Luckily, the only buyer-controlled placeholder available in pretix by default (that is not validated in a way that prevents the issue) is {invoice_company}, which is very unusual (but not impossible) to be contained in an email subject template. In addition to broadening the attack surface of the first issue, this could theoretically also leak information about an order to one of the attendees within that order. However, we also consider this scenario very unlikely under typical conditions. Out of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ file.

There are packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability referenced in the following CVE:

  - Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when
    {name} is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's name for the final email. This
    mechanism contained two security-relevant bugs: * It was possible to exfiltrate information about the
    pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}.
    This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates (usually every user of the pretix
    backend) could retrieve sensitive information from the system configuration, including even database
    passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such malicious placeholders,
    however due to a mistake in the code, they were not fully effective for the email subject. * Placeholders
    in subjects and plain text bodies of emails were wrongfully evaluated twice. Therefore, if the first
    evaluation of a placeholder again contains a placeholder, this second placeholder was rendered. This
    allows the rendering of placeholders controlled by the ticket buyer, and therefore the exploitation of the
    first issue as a ticket buyer. Luckily, the only buyer-controlled placeholder available in pretix by
    default (that is not validated in a way that prevents the issue) is {invoice_company}, which is very
    unusual (but not impossible) to be contained in an email subject template. In addition to broadening the
    attack surface of the first issue, this could theoretically also leak information about an order to one of
    the attendees within that order. However, we also consider this scenario very unlikely under typical
    conditions. Out of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your
    pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ file. (CVE-2026-2415)

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
437857	SCA: security update for pretix (GHSA-r8p8-qw9w-j9qv)	Tenable Cloud Security	SCA Checks	critical
437857	SCA: security update for pretix (GHSA-r8p8-qw9w-j9qv)	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	SCA Checks	critical

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2026-2415

critical

Tenable Plugins

critical

critical