In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs. While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private. Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct place which is during inode eviction.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eecce026399917f6efa532c56bc7a3e9dd6ee68b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae10787d955fb255d381e0d5589451dd72c614b1
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a732ed26fbd048e7925d227af8cf9ea43fb5cc9
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13bc2772414d68e94e273dea013181a986948ddf