A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, virt-handler dials Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod via /proc/<pid>/root/ paths using net.Dial() without symlink protection. These socket paths reside in qemu-owned directories writable by the virt-launcher user. An attacker with namespace edit and pods/exec permissions can replace a migration proxy socket with a symlink to the host CRI-O socket. Because virt-handler runs as root in the host mount namespace, absolute symlink targets resolve against the host filesystem, and the bidirectional io.Copy proxy relays attacker-controlled bytes to the container runtime, enabling full node compromise.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53838
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53826
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53797
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53763
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53728
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53721
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53684
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53671
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53655