Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root. The hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname. This issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115693
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/978
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4
Published: 2026-10-26
Updated: 2026-10-26
Base Score: 9.4
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:N
Severity: High
Base Score: 9.1
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Severity: Critical
Base Score: 9.1
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: Critical
EPSS: 0.00267