Grav CMS's scheduler-webhook plugin contains an authentication bypass in the webhook token check. When the webhook feature is enabled but no webhookToken is configured, a compound conditional short-circuits and skips token validation, so an unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach POST /scheduler/webhook can trigger the operator's already-configured scheduled jobs by sending a single request. The primitive is triggering-existing-jobs, not attacker-chosen command execution: the attacker controls when the jobs run and which one runs (via ?job=), but does not control what the jobs do. Code execution follows only when the operator has configured a job that shells out, and even then the attacker controls timing rather than payload. Not a default-install issue: reaching the endpoint requires the separate scheduler-webhook GPM plugin to be installed, scheduler.modern.webhook.enabled to be true (default false), and no webhookToken to be configured; a stock Grav or Grav-Admin install exposes nothing here.
https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-xwv3-2mv2-w33x
https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/694f1dae06d9061bbf0669c4291e3b206f998d71
Published: 2026-08-07
Updated: 2026-08-07
Base Score: 7.5
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Severity: High
Base Score: 7.3
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Severity: High
Base Score: 6.9
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: Medium
EPSS: 0.00506