OpenChoreo is a developer platform for Kubernetes. From 1.0.0 until 1.0.6, 1.1.7, and 1.2.5, the PUT .../workflowruns/{runName} update route authorizes a request using the openchoreo.dev/project and openchoreo.dev/component labels in the submitted body while selecting the stored WorkflowRun by the URL path. An authenticated caller with workflowrun:update for one project or component in the same namespace can name another run in the path, submit ownership labels for a scope they control, and rewrite the victim run's ownership labels. Subsequent authorization then treats the attacker as authorized to read build logs and Kubernetes events, delete the run, modify pending spec.workflow.parameters, or place the run into a permanent ComponentValidationFailed state. The namespace comes from the URL, so the issue is cross-project or cross-component within one namespace and is not anonymously reachable or cross-tenant. This issue is fixed in 1.0.6, 1.1.7, and 1.2.5.
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/security/advisories/GHSA-46r4-q7wv-32fc
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/releases/tag/v1.2.5
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/releases/tag/v1.1.7
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/releases/tag/v1.0.6
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4627
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4626
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4618
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4596
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/commit/d5ed0ef62d9c9af7b05a72aed2bcbc0ac9d45426
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/commit/91e1e868eb8e0e67274109018d00a767b22eda14
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/commit/477031c6fece0666f144942fb02c0b579dacc0bb
https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/commit/0e311468bb704b0dce7753b89c9d0204009285ca