Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy. The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-112880
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/989
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5
Published: 2026-10-26
Updated: 2026-10-26
Base Score: 5
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 8.2
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Severity: High
Base Score: 2.1
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
Severity: Low
EPSS: 0.00188