Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation. This time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allowed an attacker who could write to the workspace to atomically replace a project file with a symlink, causing Claude Code to follow the symlink and write its output to an arbitrary file outside the project sandbox. Exploitation required the ability to win a race condition against the write operation and write access to the shared workspace, enabling a lower-privileged attacker to redirect benign edits to sensitive files (e.g., shell configuration) in a higher-privileged session. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.
https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-5j29-h97v-84ch
Published: 2026-10-07
Updated: 2026-10-07
Base Score: 7.5
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:C
Severity: High
Base Score: 7.5
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Severity: High
Base Score: 7.7
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: High
EPSS: 0.00251