In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established During connect(), acting on a signal/timeout by disconnecting an already established socket leads to several issues: 1. connect() invoking vsock_transport_cancel_pkt() -> virtio_transport_purge_skbs() may race with sendmsg() invoking virtio_transport_get_credit(). This results in a permanently elevated `vvs->bytes_unsent`. Which, in turn, confuses the SOCK_LINGER handling. 2. connect() resetting a connected socket's state may race with socket being placed in a sockmap. A disconnected socket remaining in a sockmap breaks sockmap's assumptions. And gives rise to WARNs. 3. connect() transitioning SS_CONNECTED -> SS_UNCONNECTED allows for a transport change/drop after TCP_ESTABLISHED. Which poses a problem for any simultaneous sendmsg() or connect() and may result in a use-after-free/null-ptr-deref. Do not disconnect socket on signal/timeout. Keep the logic for unconnected sockets: they don't linger, can't be placed in a sockmap, are rejected by sendmsg(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1c170cae285e4b8f61be043bb17addc3d0a14b5
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab6b19f690d89ae4709fba73a3c4a7911f495b7a
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5998da5a8208ae9ad7838ba322bccb2bdcd95e81
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f71753935d648082a8279a97d30efe6b85be680
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/002541ef650b742a198e4be363881439bb9d86b4