Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1. Summary The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations. Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly. Details The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoC const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5) Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000. Impact Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

The remote Fedora 43 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2026-a84e0ad039 advisory.

    Update nodejs modules used by pccs daemon for CVE-2026-23745, CVE-2026-23950, CVE-2026-24842,     CVE-2025-13465, CVE-2025-15284.
    Remove Fedora override of default pccs daemon port.
    Remove redundant dep on mpa_registration from pccs.
    Add system scriptlets for pccs server.
    Port to pycryptography & pyasn1.
    Fix tracebacks in keyring code.


Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Fedora security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The version of Atlassian Jira Service Management Data Center and Server (Jira Service Desk) running on the remote host is affected by a vulnerability as referenced in the JSDSERVER-16491 advisory.

  - Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: <     6.14.1. SummaryThe arrayLimit option in qs does not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2),     allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. Applications using arrayLimit for DoS     protection are vulnerable. DetailsThe arrayLimit option only checks limits for indexed notation     (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but completely bypasses it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code     (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No     arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit     checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses     utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175     checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoCTest 1 - Basic bypass: npm install qs const     qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 });
    console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5) Test 2 - DoS demonstration: const qs =     require('qs'); const attack = 'a[]=' + Array(10000).fill('x').join('&a[]='); const result =     qs.parse(attack, { arrayLimit: 100 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 10000 (should be max 100)     Configuration: * arrayLimit: 5 (test 1) or arrayLimit: 100 (test 2) * Use bracket notation: a[]=value (not     indexed a[0]=value) ImpactDenial of Service via memory exhaustion. Affects applications using qs.parse()     with user-controlled input and arrayLimit for protection. Attack scenario: * Attacker sends HTTP request:
    GET /api/search?filters[]=x&filters[]=x&...&filters[]=x (100,000+ times) * Application parses with     qs.parse(query, { arrayLimit: 100 }) * qs ignores limit, parses all 100,000 elements into array * Server     memory exhausted  application crashes or becomes unresponsive * Service unavailable for all users Real-     world impact: * Single malicious request can crash server * No authentication required * Easy to automate     and scale * Affects any endpoint parsing query strings with bracket notation (CVE-2025-15284)

Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The version of Tencent Linux installed on the remote TencentOS Server 4 host is prior to tested version. It is, therefore, affected by a vulnerability as referenced in the TSSA-2026:0007 advisory.

    Package updates are available for TencentOS Server 4 that fix the following vulnerabilities:

    CVE-2025-15284:
    Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: <     6.14.1.


    SummaryThe arrayLimitoption in qs does not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), allowing     attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. Applications using arrayLimitfor DoS     protection are vulnerable.

    DetailsThe arrayLimitoption only checks limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but completely     bypasses it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).

    Vulnerable code(lib/parse.js:159-162):

    if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) {       obj = utils.combine([], leaf);  // No arrayLimit check     }





    Working code(lib/parse.js:175):

    else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) {  // Limit checked here       obj = [];
      obj[index] = leaf;
    }





    The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf)without validating against     options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimitbefore creating     arrays.

    PoCTest 1 - Basic bypass:

    npm install qs





    const qs = require('qs');
    const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 });
    console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 6 (should be max 5)





    Test 2 - DoS demonstration:

    const qs = require('qs');
    const attack = 'a[]=' + Array(10000).fill('x').join('&a[]=');
    const result = qs.parse(attack, { arrayLimit: 100 });
    console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 10000 (should be max 100)





    Configuration:

    *  arrayLimit: 5(test 1) or arrayLimit: 100(test 2)
    *  Use bracket notation: a[]=value(not indexed a[0]=value)


    ImpactDenial of Service via memory exhaustion. Affects applications using qs.parse()with user-controlled     input and arrayLimitfor protection.

    Attack scenario:

    *  Attacker sends HTTP request: GET /api/search?filters[]=x&filters[]=x&...&filters[]=x(100,000+ times)
    *  Application parses with qs.parse(query, { arrayLimit: 100 })
    *  qs ignores limit, parses all 100,000 elements into array
    *  Server memory exhausted  application crashes or becomes unresponsive
    *  Service unavailable for all users     Real-world impact:

    *  Single malicious request can crash server
    *  No authentication required
    *  Easy to automate and scale
    *  Affects any endpoint parsing query strings with bracket notation

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Tencent Linux security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The Linux/Unix host has one or more packages installed that are impacted by a vulnerability without a vendor supplied patch available.

  - Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: <     6.14.1. Summary The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2),     only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across     all array notations. Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario     originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than     parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity     has been reduced accordingly. Details The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation     (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code     (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No     arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit     checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses     utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175     checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoC const qs = require('qs'); const result =     qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); //     Output: 6 (should be max 5) Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's DoS     demonstration claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000     parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000. Impact Consistency bug in     arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since     parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket     notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.
    (CVE-2025-15284)

Note that Nessus relies on the presence of the package as reported by the vendor.

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
299072	Fedora 43 : linux-sgx (2026-a84e0ad039)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	high
297642	Atlassian Jira Service Management Data Center and Server 10.3.x < 10.3.16 (JSDSERVER-16491)	Nessus	Misc.	medium
282604	TencentOS Server 4: grafana (TSSA-2026:0007)	Nessus	Tencent Local Security Checks	high
280190	Linux Distros Unpatched Vulnerability : CVE-2025-15284	Nessus	Misc.	medium

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2025-15284

medium

Tenable Plugins

high

medium

high

medium