The daemon in Tor through 0.4.1.8 and 0.4.2.x through 0.4.2.6 does not verify that a rendezvous node is known before attempting to connect to it, which might make it easier for remote attackers to discover circuit information. NOTE: The network team of Tor claims this is an intended behavior and not a vulnerability
https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/868-Deanonymizing-Tor-Circuits.html
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33129
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-8516
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-February/014147.html
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-February/014146.html