The AlmaLinux 9.2 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the TuxCare ALMALINUX9.2:CLSA-2026:1792414477 advisory.

  - Issue summary: Calling the OpenSSL API function SSL_select_next_proto with an empty supported client     protocols buffer may cause a crash or memory contents to be sent to the peer. Impact summary: A buffer     overread can have a range of potential consequences such as unexpected application beahviour or a crash.
    In particular this issue could result in up to 255 bytes of arbitrary private data from memory being sent     to the peer leading to a loss of confidentiality. However, only applications that directly call the     SSL_select_next_proto function with a 0 length list of supported client protocols are affected by this     issue. This would normally never be a valid scenario and is typically not under attacker control but may     occur by accident in the case of a configuration or programming error in the calling application. The     OpenSSL API function SSL_select_next_proto is typically used by TLS applications that support ALPN     (Application Layer Protocol Negotiation) or NPN (Next Protocol Negotiation). NPN is older, was never     standardised and is deprecated in favour of ALPN. We believe that ALPN is significantly more widely     deployed than NPN. The SSL_select_next_proto function accepts a list of protocols from the server and a     list of protocols from the client and returns the first protocol that appears in the server list that also     appears in the client list. In the case of no overlap between the two lists it returns the first item in     the client list. In either case it will signal whether an overlap between the two lists was found. In the     case where SSL_select_next_proto is called with a zero length client list it fails to notice this     condition and returns the memory immediately following the client list pointer (and reports that there was     no overlap in the lists). This function is typically called from a server side application callback for     ALPN or a client side application callback for NPN. In the case of ALPN the list of protocols supplied by     the client is guaranteed by libssl to never be zero in length. The list of server protocols comes from the     application and should never normally be expected to be of zero length. In this case if the     SSL_select_next_proto function has been called as expected (with the list supplied by the client passed in     the client/client_len parameters), then the application will not be vulnerable to this issue. If the     application has accidentally been configured with a zero length server list, and has accidentally passed     that zero length server list in the client/client_len parameters, and has additionally failed to correctly     handle a no overlap response (which would normally result in a handshake failure in ALPN) then it will     be vulnerable to this problem. In the case of NPN, the protocol permits the client to opportunistically     select a protocol when there is no overlap. OpenSSL returns the first client protocol in the no overlap     case in support of this. The list of client protocols comes from the application and should never normally     be expected to be of zero length. However if the SSL_select_next_proto function is accidentally called     with a client_len of 0 then an invalid memory pointer will be returned instead. If the application uses     this output as the opportunistic protocol then the loss of confidentiality will occur. This issue has been     assessed as Low severity because applications are most likely to be vulnerable if they are using NPN     instead of ALPN - but NPN is not widely used. It also requires an application configuration or programming     error. Finally, this issue would not typically be under attacker control making active exploitation     unlikely. The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. Due to the low     severity of this issue we are not issuing new releases of OpenSSL at this time. The fix will be included     in the next releases when they become available. (CVE-2024-5535)

  - Issue summary: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for ECDSA and SM2 signature     operations with curves that do not have a dedicated implementation leaks information about the secret     nonce through timing. Impact summary: An attacker able to measure signing times may learn information     about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures can, via a lattice / Hidden Number     Problem attack, lead to recovery of the private key. CWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy     Description: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for curves that do not have a dedicated     constant-time implementation pads the secret scalar with non-constant-time BIGNUM operations, so the time     taken depends on the value of the secret scalar derived from the ECDSA and SM2 nonce. The leak is very     small; observing it requires a large number of measurements. The effect is largest for curves whose group     order lies on a machine-word boundary, such as brainpoolP384r1. Applications using ECDSA signing over the     Brainpool and other generic prime curves, and SM2 signing on platforms that use the generic     implementation, are vulnerable to this issue. The NIST curves P-256, P-384 and P-521 use dedicated     constant-time implementations and are not affected. FIPS Impact: no The FIPS modules are not affected: the     approved NIST curves used in the FIPS provider have dedicated constant-time implementations and do not use     the affected code path. (CVE-2026-54872)

  - Issue summary: A CMP client that requests certificate revocation on the basis of a PKCS#10 CSR may     dereference a NULL pointer and terminate abnormally when processing a crafted revocation response. Impact     summary: The NULL pointer dereference happens on a read which leads to a crash and a Denial of Service for     the affected client application. CWE: CWE-476: NULL-pointer dereference Description: A CMP client revoking     a certificate has to tell the server which certificate to revoke, and may do so by supplying a PKCS#10 CSR     instead of the certificate itself or its issuer name and serial number. This is 'openssl cmp -cmd rr -csr     <file>' on the command line, or OSSL_CMP_exec_RR_ses() with the certificate supplied via     OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_p10CSR() through the API. A CSR does not contain the issuer name and serial number of     the certificate, so the client does not send them. A server may optionally name the certificate it revoked     in its response, and the client then compares that name against what it sent. Having sent neither an     issuer name nor a serial number, it has nothing to compare against, and a server returning a specially     crafted name causes the client to read from a NULL pointer and crash. The revocation response is checked     for valid message protection before the affected code is reached, so an attacker must be a malicious or     compromised CMP server, or a man-in-the-middle in possession of the secret used for message protection.
    Clients that identify the certificate to be revoked by a certificate or by issuer and serial number rather     than by a PKCS#10 CSR are not affected. FIPS impact: no No FIPS modules are affected by this issue, as the     CMP protocol implementation is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary. (CVE-2026-75805)

  - Issue summary: An established DTLS 1.2 association using an AEAD cipher suite can be terminated by a     single unauthenticated datagram whose encrypted fragment is shorter than the mandatory explicit IV and     authentication tag overhead. Impact summary: An attacker who can send a datagram that is routed to an     existing DTLS 1.2 association can tear that association down without knowing any key material. This is a     Denial of Service limited to the targeted association. There is no memory safety or confidentiality     impact. CWE: CWE-1284: Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input Description: In TLS 1.2 and DTLS     1.2 every record protected by an AEAD cipher suite carries an explicit IV followed by the ciphertext and     an authentication tag. When decrypting such a record the record layer passed the record length to the     cipher implementation before checking that the record was long enough to contain the explicit IV and the     tag. For a record shorter than that overhead the cipher implementation rejected the impossible length, and     the record layer treated this as an internal failure and raised a fatal internal_error alert instead of     treating the record as one that failed authentication. In TLS 1.2 the same record causes a fatal     internal_error alert instead of the expected bad_record_mac alert. Since any undecryptable record already     terminates a TLS connection, this is a protocol conformance issue rather than a security issue in TLS. The     fix validates the record length against the explicit IV and tag length before any AEAD processing, so that     TLS reports bad_record_mac and DTLS silently discards the record. FIPS impact: no The affected code is     outside the FIPS module boundary. (CVE-2026-75806)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

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AlmaLinux 9.2 [TuxCare] Security Update: openssl / openssl-devel / openssl-libs / openssl-perl Multiple Vulnerabilities (ALMALINUX9.2:CLSA-2026:1792414477)

critical Nessus Plugin ID 367372

Version 1.2