The Linux/Unix host has one or more packages installed that are impacted by a vulnerability without a vendor supplied patch available.

  - net/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit     path by setting the path state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to be sampled clear     before swapping the underlying socket and calling rds_send_path_reset(). Sampling the bit clear is not the     same as owning it: rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns. Its     state recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the resetter writes the state and reads     the bit, the sender writes the bit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire     operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write and the transmit path     then runs concurrently with rds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly what the     comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to prevent. Take the lock instead, hold it across     the socket swap and rds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end. The lock-ordering     constraint documented above the wait still holds: the lock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender     inside tcp_sendmsg() can never be waited on while we hold the socket lock. Two details of the old code go     away with the same change: - t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired. The old code cached it     before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown() releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer     cached before the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes. Reading it under RDS_IN_XMIT is     what makes the exclusion complete once the teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges;
    until then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths remain as exposed to each other as     they are today. - The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no serialization at all. It     now runs under the lock like the normal path. The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the     previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path found without a socket is either still     connecting (its reconnect worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes RESETTING -> UP on the     new socket, or it has been torn down meanwhile and is dropped. The in-function comment describing the old     wait-based quiesce is rewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment above the     function (which still described a return value and an incomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to     name all four writers - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what serializes each of them.
    (CVE-2026-98070)

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Linux Distros Unpatched Vulnerability : CVE-2026-98070

high Nessus Plugin ID 350536

Version 1.2