Detections
Analytics

Google: sys-kernel/cchost-kernel-6_12, sys-kernel/csql-kernel-6_12, sys-kernel/csql-kernel-6_6, sys-kernel/lakitu-kernel-6_12, sys-kernel/lakitu-kernel-6_6, sys-kernel/lakitu-nc-kernel-6_12, sys-kernel/lakitu-nc-kernel-6_6, sys-kernel/lakitu-vgpu-kernel-6_6: security update to 19216.700.7

medium Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security Plugin ID 468470

Description

There are packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability referenced in the following CVE:

 - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_htb: limit htb_classify
 inner-class filter hops htb_classify() follows each filter-selected inner class by switching to
 cl->filter_list, but never bounds the number of hops. A filter on an inner class can point back to itself
 or to another inner class that points back, creating an infinite loop in the packet classification path
 with the qdisc lock held and BH disabled — a soft lockup / panic from a single packet. Bound the traversal
 with a hop counter and drop the packet with a rate-limited warning once the bound is exceeded. The counter
 is incremented at the point the inner filter chain is picked up, after the TC_ACT_* switch has consumed
 the classifier verdict, so a terminal TC_ACT_QUEUED/STOLEN/TRAP on the last permitted chain still sets
 *qerr to __NET_XMIT_STOLEN and the packet is not charged as a drop by this qdisc or its parent. The bound
 is TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH, taken from HTB's own parameters rather than from the qdisc hierarchy depth limit.
 Class levels run from 0 to TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH - 1, so a traversal that strictly descends in level can take at
 most TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH hops. That descent is what a sane configuration does, but it is assumed here rather
 than enforced: htb_find() resolves a classid against every class in the qdisc, so a filter may equally
 select a sibling or an ancestor. The normal root -> inner -> leaf path takes a single hop, so the bound
 does not affect legitimate classification. htb_classify() can now return NULL irrespective of
 CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT, whereas previously every NULL return sat inside that ifdef. The NULL handler in
 htb_enqueue() therefore cannot stay conditional either, so drop the ifdef around it. This matches
 hfsc_enqueue(), which has always handled a NULL class unconditionally. Without it, a kernel built without
 actions would dereference a NULL class instead of dropping. Conditions to recreate the bug: -
 CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_SCH_HTB, CONFIG_NET_CLS_U32, CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR. - Create an HTB qdisc on
 a device (e.g. lo), add an inner class 1:1 with a leaf child 1:10, install a root u32 filter selecting
 1:1, and an inner-class u32 filter on 1:1 also selecting 1:1. - Send one packet (ping). On the unfixed
 kernel the classify loop spins with the qdisc lock held; with softlockup_panic=1 it panics. - Reachable
 from unprivileged user via unshare -Urn (CAP_NET_ADMIN). (CVE-2026-90053)

Solution

Update the sys-kernel/cchost-kernel-6_12 library and its related packages to version 19216.700.7 or later.

See Also

https://storage.googleapis.com/cos-oval-vulnerability-feed/cos-125.oval.xml.tar.gz

Plugin Details

Severity: Medium

ID: 468470

Version: Revision 1.6

Type: Local

Published: 10/3/2026

Updated: 10/6/2026

Supported Sensors: Tenable Cloud Security, Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security

Risk Information

VPR

Risk Factor: Medium

Score: 5

Percentile: 93.3

Vendor

Vendor Severity: LOW

CVSS v2

Risk Factor: Medium

Base Score: 4.9

Temporal Score: 3.6

Vector: CVSS2#AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C

CVSS Score Source: CVE-2026-90053

CVSS v3

Risk Factor: Medium

Base Score: 6.5

Temporal Score: 5.7

Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Temporal Vector: CVSS:3.0/E:U/RL:O/RC:C

Vulnerability Information

Exploit Ease: No known exploits are available

Vulnerability Publication Date: 9/17/2026

Reference Information

CVE: CVE-2026-90053