Detections
Analytics

BIND-9X-001280 - On the BIND 9.x server, the private keys corresponding to both the zone signing key (ZSK) and the key signing key (KSK) must not be kept on the BIND 9.x DNSSEC-aware primary authoritative name server when the name server does not support dynamic updates.

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Information

The private keys in the KSK and ZSK key pairs must be protected from unauthorized access. If possible, the private keys should be stored offline (with respect to the internet-facing, DNSSEC-aware name server) in a physically secure, nonnetwork-accessible machine along with the zone file primary copy.

This strategy is not feasible in situations in which the DNSSEC-aware name server has to support dynamic updates. To support dynamic update transactions, the DNSSEC-aware name server (which usually is a primary authoritative name server) has to have both the zone file primary copy and the private key corresponding to the zone-signing key (ZSK-private) online to immediately update the signatures for the updated RRsets. The private key corresponding to the key-signing key (KSK-private) can still be kept offline.

NOTE: Nessus has provided the target output to assist in reviewing the benchmark to ensure target compliance.

Solution

Remove any ZSK or KSK private key from any BIND 9.x server that does not support dynamic updates.

Note: Any ZSK or KSK that is not needed to support dynamic updates must be stored offline in a secure location.

See Also

https://dl.dod.cyber.mil/wp-content/uploads/stigs/zip/U_BIND_9-x_V3R1_STIG.zip

Item Details

References: CAT|II, CCI|CCI-000366, Rule-ID|SV-272385r1124044_rule, STIG-ID|BIND-9X-001280, Vuln-ID|V-272385

Plugin: Unix

Control ID: 19316a15b8464c13e87e761406b17ebe3ce771fdc537a87ee074e8a9c6d43c7c