When a command is executed on the command line, for example mysql -u admin -p password or mysqlsh -u admin -p password the password may be visible in the user's shell/command history or in the process list. If the password is visible in the process list or user's shell/command history, an attacker will be able to access the MySQL database using the stolen credentials. NOTE: Nessus has not performed this check. Please review the benchmark to ensure target compliance.
Solution
MySQL Client: Use -p without password and then enter the password when prompted, use a properly securedmy.cnf file, or store authentication information in encrypted format inmylogin.cnf MySQL Shell: Use without password and then enter the password when prompted, store authentication information in encrypted format inmylogin.cnf enter shell then authenticate using \connect command ( Note: this also ensures the username is not exposed on the command), or use mysqlsh pluggable password store, e.g., a keychain. Impact: Depending on the remediation chosen, additional steps may need to be undertaken like: - Entering a password when prompted. - Ensuring the file permissions onmy.cnf is restricted yet accessible by the user. - Using mysql_config_editor to encrypt the authentication credentials inmylogin.cnf - Use a pluggable secure password store, e.g., a keychain. - In the case of shell don't authenticate until mysqlsh is started, then use \connect Additionally, not all scripts/applications may be able to usemylogin.cnf