18.9.7.1.5 Ensure 'Prevent installation of devices using drivers that match these device setup classes: Prevent installation of devices using drivers for these device setup' is set to 'IEEE 1394 device setup classes' - IEEE 1394 device setup classes

Information

This policy setting allows you to specify a list of device setup class globally unique identifiers (GUIDs) for device drivers that Windows is prevented from installing. This policy setting takes precedence over any other policy setting that allows Windows to install a device.

If you enable this policy setting, Windows is prevented from installing or updating device drivers whose device setup class GUIDs appear in the list you create. If you enable this policy setting on a remote desktop server, the policy setting affects redirection of the specified devices from a remote desktop client to the remote desktop server.

If you disable or do not configure this policy setting, Windows can install and update devices as allowed or prevented by other policy settings.

Here are the four entries we recommend and what they translate to:

{d48179be-ec20-11d1-b6b8-00c04fa372a7} - IEEE 1394 devices that support the SBP2 Protocol Class

{7ebefbc0-3200-11d2-b4c2-00a0C9697d07} - IEEE 1394 devices that support the IEC-61883 Protocol Class

{c06ff265-ae09-48f0-812c-16753d7cba83} - IEEE 1394 devices that support the AVC Protocol Class

{6bdd1fc1-810f-11d0-bec7-08002be2092f} - IEEE 1394 Host Bus Controller Class

The full list of system-defined device setup classes available in Windows is here: System-Defined Device Setup Classes Available to Vendors | Microsoft Docs

The recommended state for this setting is: {d48179be-ec20-11d1-b6b8-00c04fa372a7}, {7ebefbc0-3200-11d2-b4c2-00a0C9697d07}, {c06ff265-ae09-48f0-812c-16753d7cba83}, and {6bdd1fc1-810f-11d0-bec7-08002be2092f}

Note: IEEE 1394 has also been known/branded as FireWire (by Apple), i.LINK (by Sony) and Lynx (by Texas Instruments).

Rationale:

A BitLocker-protected computer may be vulnerable to Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks when the computer is turned on or is in the Standby power state - this includes when the workstation is locked.

BitLocker with TPM-only authentication lets a computer enter the power-on state without any pre-boot authentication. Therefore, an attacker may be able to perform DMA attacks.

This issue is documented in Microsoft Knowledge Base article 2516445: Blocking the SBP-2 driver and Thunderbolt controllers to reduce 1394 DMA and Thunderbolt DMA threats to BitLocker.

Impact:

IEEE 1394 drives & devices will be prevented from being installed in Windows.

Solution

To establish the recommended configuration via GP, set the following UI path to Enabled, and add {d48179be-ec20-11d1-b6b8-00c04fa372a7}, {7ebefbc0-3200-11d2-b4c2-00a0C9697d07}, {c06ff265-ae09-48f0-812c-16753d7cba83}, and {6bdd1fc1-810f-11d0-bec7-08002be2092f} to the device setup classes list:

Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Device Installation\Device Installation Restrictions\Prevent installation of devices using drivers that match these device setup classes

Note: This Group Policy path is provided by the Group Policy template DeviceInstallation.admx/adml that is included with all versions of the Microsoft Windows Administrative Templates.

Default Value:

None. (No device setup classes are prevented from installation.)

Additional Information:

Documented in MSKB 2516445.

See Also

https://workbench.cisecurity.org/benchmarks/13204

Item Details

Category: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

References: 800-53|SI-3c.2.

Plugin: Windows

Control ID: 2cbf7bf299c5cfbeb0c36de631158da0abd1df9bee6830e6a5aa1a255e9b98e3